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THE STUDENT AUTHOR AND THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT:
A CONSIDERATION OF SOME PECULIAR PROBLEMSt
Robert B. Carpenter*
I. Introduction
Although students, as a class, produce considerable copyrightable material,
they generally are uninformed about the law of copyright and the way it can
protect their intellectual efforts. Some students may be aware that a copyright is
similar to a patent, in that it protects the person's financial interest in his creation
by restricting others' use of that creation. Most students do not appreciate the
manner of obtaining copyright or the specific nature of its protection, and, thereby
frequently forfeit potentially valuable property interests in their literary and
artistic productions. They prove easy prey for the plagiarist who reaps the benefits
of someone else's intellectual labors while expending little or no effort of his own.
Informing students of the basis of copyright law, then, would allow them to
protect material that otherwise would pass into the public domain; yet despite
this, there is little writing on student copyright problems. It is an unfortunate
fact that student works are frequently plagiarized, sometimes by other students
and often by faculty. Tales of pilfered projects, theses, and other written work
are too common to be mere concoctions or isolated incidents. This use of student
material may be a symptom of the acute "publish or perish" syndrome that affects
campuses today. For whatever reason, however, students are often and easily
t On February 19, 1976, after the manuscript for this article was prepared, the Senate
unanimously approved a bill calling for a general revision of the Copyright Act, Title 17 of
the United States Code. The Senate bill (S. 22) is presently under consideration by the House
of Representatives, having recently been referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary. The Senate
enactment is similar in content to earlier legislation that was approved by the Senate in Sep-
tember 1974 (S. 1361), and it also closely resembles a measure adopted in 1967 by the House
of Representatives. Given these earlier efforts at revision, passage of S. 22 would certainly
not appear to be a foregone conclusion.
S. 22 provides for an amalgamation of state and federal copyright laws under one unified
system and, thus, represents a considerable departure from present law. Viewed from the
perspective of this article, S. 22 proposes a radical change since it would include protection of
unpublished works under the federal statutory scheme. A close reading indicates that the bill,
if enacted, would not affect the fundamental premise of this article: student works would
still be protectible by copyright laws. S. 22 does. however, affect certain other aspects of the
analysis presented herein. For example, the doctrine of fair use is expressly recognized in §
107, although the statute does not provide much substance to the term. Section 204 requires
that certain formalities (a written "instrument" signed by the owner) must be met before
copyright can be effectively transferred, which should prove advantageous to students who
claim that no copyright interest was intended to be passed by delivery of a copy. The strict
notice requirements for published works are substantially modified in §§ 401-05. And, § 301
establishes a new term for the duration of copyright in both published and unpublished works,
that being "the life of the author and fifty years after his death."
It must be stressed again, however, that the basic premise of this article would be unaf-
fected by enactment of S. 22: copyright is presently and will continue to be available to pro-
tect student works, and students ought not to disregard the practical importance of copyright
protection.
* Law and Humanities Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Temple University of Law; Member,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Bars; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1975; A.B., Bowdoin
College, 1971.
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deprived of potentially valuable property interests in their literary and artistic
productions.
This article seeks to be both informative and analytic. After briefly intro-
ducing the law of copyright, it considers whether student works ought to be dis-
tinguished from other forms of literary property. The following issues are ad-
dressed: (1) whether a student can be treated as an author for hire with regard
to works submitted for academic credit; (2) whether the student effects a transfer
of ownership or copyright when he submits a work for credit; and (3) the extent
of common law copyright, and whether the doctrine of fair use is applicable to
works protected by common law copyright. It will be concluded that individual
controversies are better solved nonjudicially, through an institutional/adminis-
trative framework. While legal process will ordinarily be available, students
should attempt to apply the time-tested techniques of bargaining, arbitration
and institutional settlement before resorting to the legal system.
II. The Applicability of Copyright to Student Works:
An Introduction to the Law of Copyright
A copyright protects literary property by granting to the author a right to
prevent others from copying his intellectual production.' Copyright thereby
endows an author with the privilege of the exclusive use of and profits from his
"literary property."2 Literary property is a form of personal property that is not
necessarily tangible or corporeal.' As the court explained in Werckmeister v.
American Lithographic Co.,
4
The author of a painting, when it is finished, before publication, owns a
material piece of personal property, consisting of the canvas and the paint
upon it. He also owns an incorporeal right connected with it; that is, the
right to make a copy of it. These two kinds of property, although growing
out of the same intellectual production, are in their nature essentially and
inherently distinct.... [T he law has always recognized that a common-law
1 "Copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law, is a monopoly; it con-
sists only in the power to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work." R.C.A.
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940). See Walden, Common Law Rights in Literary Property, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 642
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Walden]; STRAUSS, PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WOaS, STUDY
No. 29, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 1961 [hereinafter cited as Study No. 29]; Pickard, Com-
mon-Law Rights Before Publication, ASCAP THIRD COPYRIGHT SYMPosiUM 229 (1940). See
generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1963) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
2 See Walden, supra note 1, at 643. In E. DRONE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTEL-
LEcTuAL PRODucTioNS 8 (1879), it is stated that:
[Ain author has, in the fruits of his intellectual labor, a property as whole and
inviolable as that which exists in material possessions... [He has supreme control
over such productions, may exclude others from their enjoyment and may dispose of
them as he Dleases.
The copyrightable by-products of "intellectual labor" are by no means strictly confined to the
written word. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, §§ 10-36 for a discussion of the subject matter of
copyright generally. For the purposes of this article, however, the term "student works" will
be intended to refer specifically to written materials, such as student papers, theses and dis-
sertations.
3 In Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 538-39 (1872), the court stated that an author's
property in his manuscript "is not distinguishable from any other personal property ... The
right to literary property is as sacred as that to any other species of property."
4 142 F. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1905), aff'd mem., 148 F. 1022 (2d Cir. 1906).
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copyright ... is a distinct property from the thing to which the copyright
applies. One man may be the owner of the thing, and another of the copy-
right in the thing.
Literary property may thus be seen as an incorporeal right, which exists separately
from the physical object that has been created.5
Although literary property results from the author's having reduced his
thoughts to tangible form, it is the expression of those thoughts that is the pro-
tectible subject matter of copyright.6 Practically, this two-fold nature of literary
property means that an individual's ownership rights in a copyrighted object will
be subject to the author's rights in the literary property underlying that work.
Authorship of a letter affords a good example of this distinct and separate nature
of literary property. It is generally agreed that the recipient of a letter has an
ownership interest in the paper upon which the letter has been written. How-
ever, the author of the letter retains common law copyright in the contents of the
letter and can prevent its publication by the recipient. In Baker v. Libbie,7 the
court explained:
[T]he right in the receiver of an ordinary letter is one of unqualified title in
the material on which it is written. He can deal with it as absolute owner
subject only to the author's proprietary right . .. to the publication or non-
publication of idea in its particular verbal expression.
Copyright protection in the United States is available to authors of qualified
literary and artistic works under a dual system of state and federal copyright
law.' The scope of these two bodies of law is not coextensive, however, and an
author who desires protection for his work must ordinarily determine whether
state "common law copyright" or the federally derived "statutory" copyright will
be available.' The dividing line between the operation of the common law and
statutory systems is the element of "publication," a term of art having special
meaning and significance in copyright law.' Publishing a work often determines
5 See Study No. 29, supra note 1, at 3.
6 See text accompanying note 113 infra.
7 210 Mass. 599, 607, 97 N.E. 109, - (1912). See generally 1 NIMBiER, supra note 1,
§ 64 at 247.
8 A "qualified" work is a literary production that meets the minimal requirements of
copyrightability under common law or statutory copyright. See 1 NIMu.R, supra note 1, §§
10-36. "Statutory copyright" is copyright secured under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1
et seq. (1970).
9 The dual nature of American copyright law has consistently presented problems to
courts and legislatures, particularly in terms of the treatment that is afforded unpublished
works. Proposals for the amalgamation of the common law and federal schemes into a unified
body of national copyright law have been embodied in revision legislation presented to Con-
*ress. To date, however, the Congress has not enacted these proposals into law. See Study
No. 29, supra note 1; Cary, The Quiet Revolution in Copyright: The End of the "Publication"
Concept, 35 G. WAsH. L. Rnv. 652 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Cary]. The present bill before
the Senate (S. 22) continues to reflect this suggestion. See t supra. See also, S. REP. No. 93-
983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Another, and perhaps more difficult issue nosed by this dual nature is a basic question of
federalism: to what extent does federal legislation "preempt" the field of copyright law so that
the States may not act? For the most recent Supreme Court answer to this question see Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (permit state regulation of tape/record piracy).
10 See Cary, supra note 9, at 652-59; Walden, supra note 1, at 648-56. See also notes
101-05 infra and accompanying text.
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which type of copyright, if any, may be available for the work. Generally, prop-
erty rights in unpublished works are secured under state common law, while
federal legislation protects certain forms of published literary and artistic pro-
ductions."
A. Statutory Copyright
Statutory copyright is a right wholly dependent upon federal legislation."
The first federal copyright law was enacted by Congress in 1790,' 3 pursuant to
an express constitutional grant of authority, "to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."' 4 In order to secure
statutory copyright, the author or proprietor of a qualified work must "publish"
the work with a notice of copyright appropriately affixed to each copy. Section
10 of the Copyright Act provides:' 5
Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his
work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this
title; and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or
offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright
proprietor....
The notice of copyright, "shall consist of the word 'Copyright,' the abbreviation
'Copr.', or the symbol @, accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor,
and... the year in which the copyright was secured by publication."'1 Contrary
to popular belief, all that the author must do to secure statutory copyright in his
work is to publish with a proper notice affixed to each copy.
While publication with notice will cause the author's literary property to
be protected by statutory copyright, certain other formalities must be met before
a suit may be maintained for infringement of the copyright.'7 Section 13 of the
Copyright Act provides that:'"
'No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright
in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of
copies and registration of such work has been complied with.
Additionally § 13 explicitly directs that two copies shall be deposited
"promptly" after copyright has been secured by publication.'" However, in
11 See Cary, supra note 9, at 652-59; Study No. 29, supra note 1, at 1-2.
12 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. '(8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1834). See generally 1 NIMMER,
supra note 1. § 1.
13 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the term "publi-
cation" does not have the same legal meaning in all copyright situations. See notes 101-05
infra and accompanying text.
16 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
17 See notes 106-14 infra and accompanying text for a brief discussion of what constitutes
a copyright infringement.




Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson," the Supreme Court held that the
right to sue for infringement was not destroyed by "mere delay" in complying
with the deposit requirement. The plaintiff in the Washingtonian case had not
deposited copies of the work until some fourteen months after publication, and
six months after the infringement.21
B. Common Law Copyright
Common law copyright antedates federal statutory copyright,22 and affords
more expansive protection to a broader class of literary and artistic works.22 The
existence of common law copyright was an issue considered and acknowledged
by the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters.24
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and
may obtain redress against anyone who deprives him of it, or by improperly
obtaining a copy, endeavors to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be
doubted. .... 25
At the same time, however, the Court noted that while an author has exclusive
perpetual rights in his unpublished manuscript, once the work was published, his
rights were solely dependent upon the statutes. 26 As a lasting result of the
Wheaton decision, the act of publication continues to be treated as divesting an
author of his common law copyright." Unless the author has published this
work with the requisite notice, thus investing statutory copyright, the literary
production will fall into the public domain for all to use. 8
C. Further Distinctions
In addition to the importance of publication in determining whether and
how copyright protection will be available to an author,9 there are two practical
20 306 U.S. 30, 42 (1939).
21 Id. at 34-35.
22 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-64 (1834). Consider that the very
idea behind § 2 of the Copyright Act is that the federal statutory scheme was built upon the
foundations established by common law.
23 See Study No. 29, supra note 1, at 3-4. Particularly important is the observation that"common law property rights may exist in forms of intellectual creations which are not copy-
rightable under the statute." Id. at 4. Also to be considered is the fact that common law
copyright in a work may exist perpetually, whereas the statutory right extends for a limited
time only. Id.
24 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
25 Id. at 657.
26 Id. at 591 n. 1.
27 See notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
28 Once a work enters the public domain, either by the voluntary acts of the author or by
operation of law, it is available for the unrestricted use of all persons. An important limitation,
however, is that matters in the public domain are not themselves copyrightable. See, e.g., Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 9, 104 '(2d Cir. 1951). See also 17 U.S.C. § 8
(1970), which relates specifically to the matter of copyright in works in the public domain;
and, note 75 infra.
29 Note, however, that legislation recently proposed in the Senate and presently before the
House embodies a proposal that would cause the common law copyright to be subsumed into
the federal scheme. This would end the functional importance of the act of publication. See
note 9 supra and, materials cited therein.
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distinctions between the common law and statutory schemes. First, an author
need not comply with any type of express precondition in order to secure common
law copyright. The common law copyright arises automatically upon the author's
completion of his production to protect the literary property in that work.30
This feature of common law copyright contrasts with the statutory copyright
system, under which a work will not be protected unless published with a proper
notice affixed. 1 Second, common law copyright will protect a work perpetually,
or more precisely, as long as it is not published, 2 while the monopoly resulting
from statutory copyright is limited in time to an initial period of 28 years, with
a possible renewal for another 28 years.33
Although common law copyright arises automatically-i.e., without the
necessity of compliance with specific formalities-it does not extend to every
literary and artistic creation without exception. In addition to the basic require-
ment that the work be unpublished, common law copyright will protect only those
works that are original and reduced to concrete form. 4 Originality, in this con-
text, relates to a minimal requirement that the work must "owe its origin" to the
author; 5 in other words, that it must be the result of the author's independent
intellectual effort. This concept was postulated by Judge Learned Hand in
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.:36
[iTf by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an "author," and if he
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course
copy Keats's.
Judge Hand thereby emphasized that it is the independence of the author's work
rather than its uniqueness that is determinative in assessing originality.
37
A third condition that must be met before a work will be copyrightable
under common law is that the content of the production must have been de-
veloped beyond the abstract idea.- This requirement, which is the source of
considerable confusion and controversy among commentators, is derived from a
basic precept of copyright law that "only the expression of ideas, and not the
ideas themselves are copyrightable."39
30 "Common law copyright protection is automatically accorded all unpublished works
from the moment of their creation." Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351,
357, 197 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1964). Consider also the quote excerpted from the Werckmeister
case which appears in the text at note 4 supra.
31 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
32 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus. 210 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1908) (quoting DRONE ON
CopyRiOTr); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 591 n. 1. See generally Study No. 29,
supra note 1, at 4.
33 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
34 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 11.2 at 42.2.
35 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
36 81 F.2d 49. 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
37 See Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). Professor
Nimmer suggests that "there is a reciprocal relationship between creativity and independent
effort. The smaller the effort... the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to claim
copyright protection." 1 NIMMER, supra note 1. § 10.2 at 37. However, Nimmer's examples
indicate that the suggestion was made in direct reference to the copying of short phrases of as
little as two words. Id.
38 See 1 NIMmER, supra note 1, § 11.2 at 42.2, and more generally at § 11.1.
39 Id., § 11.1 at 39.
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Preliminarily, there does not appear to be any general impediment in the
law of copyright that would prevent a student from securing copyright in a quali-
fied work under either common law or federal statute." Students, however,
rarely publish their literary and artistic works. Moreover, where publication
occurs so as to divest common law rights, the work probably will have been
published without notice, and thereby dedicated to the public domain. Mindful
of this situation, this article will focus primarily upon common law copyright,
and proceed to consider the question of whether there is any reason-in fact, or
in the law of copyright-for a student to be afforded special or disfavored treat-
ment under the common law.
III. The Student Author and the Law of Copyright:
Authorship, Transfer and Fair Use
Assuming that student work is protectible 'under common law, some
specific questions face the student author. First, is there an established copy-
right policy that might preclude a student from being considered the author of a
work that he has originated? Second, what is the effect, if any, upon the student
author's copyright in a work when there is a physical transfer of possession, such
as by submission of the work for academic credit? And, third, in what manner
may the protected work be used irrespective of the author's wishes?
A. The Student as Author and the "For Hire" Doctrine
Copyright ordinarily inures to the author of a qualified literary or artistic
work.4 An important exception to this rule is presented in the doctrine of "works
for hire," which is recognized under both common law and federal legislation.'
Section 26 of the Copyright Act specifically provides that "the word 'author'
shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire."4 A person at-
tempting to claim copyright privileges under the works for hire doctrine must
first establish the existence of an employment relationship. Also, it must be proved
by the employer that the particular copyrightable matter was created by his
employee within the course and scope of the employment, since only these works
40 Certain technicalities arise in the area of statutory copyright when the author who is
seeking copyright protection is not a United States citizen. See 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). How-
ever, common law copyright will apply irrespective of the author's nationality or domicile. See
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 539-40 (1872). See also Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424,
432-37 (1912).
41 In that common law copyright arises in a work automatically upon its completion, it
inures to the author in the first instance. The literary property in that work is then assignable.
Statutory copyright, on the other hand, may be obtained by the "author or proprietor of any
work made the subject of copyright .. .or his executors, administrators, or assigns. . . ." 17
U.S.C. § 9 (1970). Courts have interpreted the term proprietor to mean the same as assigns.
Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 262 (1903); Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co.,
139 F.2d 398, 399 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 730 (1944). See notes 67-99 infra
and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248-49 '(1903)
(application of earlier version of present Act); Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726,
78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969) (common law).
43 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
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will be deemed to fall within the ambit of the rule." Consequently, the deter-
minative issue regarding the application of this doctrine is whether or not the
particular work bears a sufficiently close relationship to the employee's duties
to be treated as a product of the employment.4 5
In those situations where the works for hire doctrine applies, the employer
has the right to obtain all those copyright privileges that would ordinarily be
available to the actual originator of the work, i.e., the author-employee. 46 Under
the federal scheme, § 26 of the Copyright Act creates a rebuttable presumption
that the legitimate work-products of an employment relationship are copyright-
able by the employer as author. However, the employee may come forward with
evidence to show the existence of an agreement giving him the right to secure
copyright as the author of the work.4" Recent judicial decisions tend to narrowly
construe the scope of § 26 of the Act." These cases appear to favor the claims
of the author/originators, at least to the extent that the employer must clearly
show the nexus between the specific employment purpose and the character and
circumstances under which the work has been produced. 49
Since the typical student is not an employee of his school and since even
those students who are at least part-time employees are not ordinarily hired for
the purpose of producing literary or otherwise copyrightable material, the author
for hire doctrine would largely seem inapplicable to the student author, at least
as to those materials specifically produced and submitted for academic credit.
This general conclusion would have to be modified as it relates to research
assistants. These individuals, often students, are customarily hired for the specific
purpose of assisting in the production of copyrightable material. This employ-
ment relationship would seem to fall well within the works for hire doctrine.
Nonetheless, copyrightable material not produced within the course and scope
44 See, e.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567
(2d Cir. 1966); Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
aff'd, 142 F.2d 497, 498-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944). See also Scherr v.
Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970).
45 See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover. 284 F.2d 262, 267-69 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962), aff'd on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (1967). See also Sawyer
v. Crowell Publishing Co., 142 F.2d 497, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1944).
46 Note, however, that under 17 U.S.C. § 24, it is the copyright proprietor at the time
of renewal who is entitled to renew the copyright for another 28-year term.
47 Cf. Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969). See also
Wells v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962). In the event that an
employee secures copyright in his own name for a work to which the employer is entitled under
the works for hire doctrine, that copyright will be deemed held in trust for the employer.
United States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co.. 62 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1932).
Professor Nimmer has questioned the constitutionality of utilizing this presumption in
favor of the employer. See I NrMmER, supra note 1, § 6.3 at 11-13.
48 See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated,
369 U.S. 111 (1962). But cf. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.. 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
49 Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated,
369 U.S. 111 (1962); Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), aff'd, 142 F.2d 497, 498-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944); Williams v.
Weisser, 273 Ca]. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969). See also Scherr v. Universal Match
Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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of the employment will not be treated as property of the employer.5 0 A persistent
question, even in light of this analysis, is whether a court might fashion an exten-
sion of the author for hire doctrine applicable to works created by students out-
side the true employment relationship.
Judicial inquiry into the existence of an employment relationship and the
nature of the employment purpose, for copyright matters, has generally focused
on three broad areas of analysis: 5 ' ( 1 ) whether the employer has a right to direct
and supervise the employee's labors; (2) whether the work is performed at the
insistence and expense of the employer, and with the use of his facilities; and,
(3) whether there is any salary or other compensation paid to the purported
employee. With respect to the first of these three factors, it is essential from a legal
standpoint that an employer must have at least the right to control the em-
ployee's day-to-day performance of his work. 2 As provided in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency,55
A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his
affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled
or is subject to the right to control by the master.
Thus, it is not mandatory that this supervision be exercised in fact, but merely
that the employer is endowed with supervisory power.5 4
To the extent that a student's day-to-day efforts in producing a literary work
are not closely supervised-in terms of precise format, subject matter and source
material, length and quality of the completed document, and the amount of time
spent in its preparation-the normal student author does not seem to fall within
this employer-employee framework. Where, however, a general supervisory in-
fluence is exerted with respect to the nature of the student's final product, but
not as to the daily activities in production, the student author might be termed
more realistically as an independent contractor.55 An independent contractor can
be described as a person, such as a plumber or electrician, who is hired by an
employer to perform a specific service, and is responsible to the employer only
for the result of his labors and not for the means of its accomplishment."6 The
effect of this distinction is relatively minor in copyright law. The employer is
entitled, as "author," to claim copyright in work produced by either an employee
50 See cases cited note 45 supra. Whether this research assistant could claim a partial
interest in the copyrighted work would be a matter for contractual agreement between the
parties. Cf. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
51 See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. at 649-51. See generally I
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 62.
52 Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. at 651, citing 1 NiMMER, supra note
1. § 62.2 at 238.2-239 (right of employer to direct and supervise). See also Scherr v. Universal
Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 396 (1970).
53 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(2) (1958) (emphasis added).
54 Id.
55 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3) provides:
(c) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do some-
thing for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right
to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the under-
taking....
56 Trzaska v. Bigane, 325 Ill. App. 528, 534, 60 N.E.2d 264, 267 (1945) (automobile tort
for personal injuries).
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or an independent contractor. However, while the employer could assume owner-
ship of and copyright in all materials produced by his employee, including such
things as preliminary drafts and working papers, the employer is entitled to claim
only the final work product of the independent contractor."' For example, ac-
countants are often considered independent contractors and thus entitled to
ownership in their working papers.5" But again, with contractors, as with regular
employees, the intent of the parties is the crucial factor.55 And, it should be noted
that courts will generally presume that copyright passes with the work unless the
employee can show a contrary agreement."0
With regard to the remaining two aspects-production at the employer's
insistence and expense, and the element of compensation-the typical student
author situation again is only generally analogous to an employment relation-
ship."' Student authorship cannot be considered voluntary insofar as a particular
work must be produced, submitted for credit, and meet the approval of an in-
stitution before the student will receive academic credit. In that sense, the work
may be said to have been done at the insistence of the institution. However, a
persuasive argument pertaining to the elements of employer expense and em-
ployee compensation is not as easily developed. In a very broad sense, an aca-
demic degree is a type of compensation, a quid pro quo for the labors expended
by the student. Moreover, students usually make use of library facilities and in-
structional personnel when preparing copyrightable material. But the fact that
students commonly pay tuition for the privilege of attending educational institu-
tions complicates matters. It is impossible to argue convincingly that there is an
element of compensation involved where a student in fact pays out what may be
a substantial sum of money as tuition to the university. 2
A student author, then, should not be treated as an author for hire under
the current statutory application of that doctrine. Neither would it be appropri-
ate to treat a student as an author for hire under a broadly expanded application
of the common law concept. The oft-stated purpose of copyright is to encourage
authorship by securing to authors the just fruits of their labors. In Mazer v.
Stein,8 for example, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion with the following
statement:
57 See, e.g., Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961), and Ipswich Mills v.
Dillon. 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927), (accountants entitled to working papers). See
also Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne. Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
58 See Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961), and Ipswich Mills v. Dillon,
260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927).
59 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 63 at 244-45.
60 Id. See, e.g., Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 686 (1940); see also Eliscu v. T. B. Harms Co., 151 U.S.P.Q. 603 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 27. 1966). See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
61 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
62 A single case has been found to support the contention that an employment relationship
could exist where there had been no compensation to the purported authors for hire. See
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 51 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass 1869), cited with approval in
Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 651.
The payment of tuition by a student should ultimately preclude his being treated as an
author for hire as to material submitted for course credit.
63 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). In the more recent case of Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 555 (1973), the Court broadly stated that the purpose of federal copyright is to
"encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation ... "
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The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts."
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commen-
surate with the services rendered.
Student authors, of course, could be distinguished from other authors in that they
do not need to be enticed into writing by financial reward. Sufficient incen-
tive exists in university academic requirements, to wit, satisfy the established
standards or fail. But the mere provision of these incentives can hardly justify
deprivation by a university of student's literary property. This is true even though
educational uses of copyrighted material are often favored over the proprietary
claims of authors. 4 Since the principal incentive to publish is something other
than financial return for most scholar-authors (such as reputation in the academic
community, and the institutional requirement of publication as a prerequisite to
academic advancement), and it would be inconsistent to permit faculty to secure
copyright while limiting copyright for students under similar conditions. And
since one court has sustained a professor's claim to common law copyright in his
lectures over an argument that the copyright properly resided in the university, 5
it is difficult to believe that the original common law copyright in a student work
submitted for academic credit could be found to reside in anyone other than the
student.
The typical argument proffered in support of the works for hire doctrine,
that the employer is entitled to the products of the employment relationship,"8
simply does not fit the student author. Insofar as there exists no employment
relationship for the production of literary property, it would seem that the nexus
.between the student and the institution-or the instructor himself-is too tenuous
to allow expansion of the author for hire doctrine into the area of student works
that are produced and submitted for academic credit.
B. Transfer of the Student Work
As has been discussed,"7 an author's copyright exists separately from either
the physical object created or any copies subsequently made of that original. The
importance of this dual nature of literary property can be better understood
when one considers that an author rarely retains exclusive possession of the un-
published work, and quite often makes and distributes copies of that work. What
is the effect of this transfer of possession? At the outset, it should be noted that
an authorized distribution of a literary production to a special group or class of
64 "[A] scholar holds an especially favored position under the copyright law. He should
feel completely free to cony whatever he legitimately needs to make his writings complete,
accurate, and authenticated." Wilson, The Scholar and the Copyright Law, ASCAP TENTH
COPYRIGHT SYMPOSIUM 104, 113 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Wilson]. See also 2 M. NImmR,
NIMMmR ON COPYRIGHT § 145 at 648.1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NiMMER].
65 In Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App.2d 726, 733, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (1969), it
was held, "that in the absence of evidence the teacher, rather than the university, owns the
common law copyright to his lectures."
66 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1903).
67 See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
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persons for a limited purpose will not ordinarily be treated as publication divesting
common law copyright.68 This distribution is termed a "limited publication,"
and common law copyright is not divested unless there has been a general pub-
lication.69 The right of "limited publication" has been broadly described as
follows:
[U]nless the owner of the common law rights chooses to register the work, he
may disseminate the work publically in every conceivable way except by
publishing copies, and his rights continue perpetually in spite of the constitu-
tional policy of copyright for a limited time.
7 0
A physical transfer of a copyrighted work, however, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, could convey the author's copyright interest to the transferee. Thus,
assuming that a student may be treated as the author of those works that have
originated with him, and that the student author's literary property is protected
under common law copyright, the discussion will now consider the potential ef-
fects upon a student's copyright when the protected work is submitted to an in-
structor for the purpose of fulfilling academic requirements.
Generally, the law of copyright places few limitations upon the transfer-
ability of rights in literary property. Although an author must abide by certain
formalities in regard to statutory copyright, 1 there are no preconditions for an
effective conveyance of common law copyright.7 ' For example, literary prop-
erty in an unpublished work may be transferred by oral agreement.7 3 A valid
transfer may be proved if it can be shown that the author had a present intention
to convey title in his literary property to the transferee at the time of delivery of
the work.74 When there has been an authorized delivery of copyrighted material
to another, therefore, the operative questions are: (1) whether the surrounding
facts support a finding that there has been a transfer of ownership in the physical
copy; and, (2) whether there may be found sufficient facts to show intent to
convey copyright as well.
Students, as a class, are characteristically uninformed about copyright
matters. It should come as no surprise, then, that students fail even to consider
the legal effects of submitting a work to the university for academic credit, much
less reduce their intentions to written form. Undoubtedly, a close analysis of the
facts involved in each transfer situation will be necessary to ascertain the precise
nature of the particular transaction. Has the student retained all of his rights in
68 See generally Cary, note 9 supra.
69 See notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
70 Strauss, note 1 supra. See generally Cary, supra note 9.
71 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1970), requires that an assignment, grant, or mortgage of copyright
must be evidenced "by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright.. .";
under § 30, assignments must be recorded with the Copyright Office. Consider the case of
DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962), which involved
the matter of the effect of a failure to record an assignment upon the various parties. See also
2 NimMER, supra note 64, § 120.2.
72 See 2 NiMEmR, supra note 64, § 120.1 at 523.
73 See Callagan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617, 658 (1888); Houghton-Miffin Co. v. Stackpole
Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir.) (issuance of temporary injunction), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 597 (1939), aflirmed on merits, 113 F.2c1 627 '(2d Cir. 1940); Fruenthal v. Hebrew
Publishing Co., 44 F. Supp. 754, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
74 See 2 NrmmaER, supra note 64, § 120.1 at 523 n.72, citing, inter alia, Atlantic Monthly
Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556, 558-59 (D. Mass. 1928).
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the work, i.e., ownership of the copy and the copyright? Has there been a valid
conveyance of some or all of those rights? Or, has the student caused the work
to pass into the public domain? 5
It is by no means an easy task to divine the intentions of a student author
at the time of delivery of his work, especially in the absence of written or oral
communications between the parties. If presented with this type of situation, a
court would be in the position of having to imply intent, not only from the actual
conduct of the parties, but from the "reasonable expectations" that each should
have formed regarding the particular transaction.7 6 Enumeration and discussion
of all the factual variations that could arise in every conceivable delivery situation
would be too lengthy and impractical to include here. However, it is worthwhile
to analyze the questions that should be asked and the factors that a court should
consider when facing a student copyright problem.
1. Why was the work produced?
a. General requirement in an introductory level or survey course.
b. Independent study or seminar where paper has been assigned in
lieu of exam.
c. Primary research project-collection and analysis of empirical data.
d. Senior paper or honors project produced to satisfy academic honors
requirements rather than course credit.
e. Master's or doctoral level thesis or dissertation.
The focus is on "expectations"; in other words, what did the parties antici-
pate would be done with the work once completed, graded and accepted for
credit? Logically, it would seem that the more substantial the work-in terms of
input and importance regarding academic credit-the greater the student's
interest in maintaining and protecting his property in that work. This obser-
vation should pertain both to ownership of the copy and to the copyright. Ad-
mittedly, this type of analysis requires weighing probabilities. Furthermore, it as-
sumes at least basic awareness of copyright law by students and, for that matter,
by faculty as well. The oft-cited case of T. 1. Hooper v. H. N. Hartwell & Son,
Inc., 7 7 provides a useful rationale for approaching this expectation factor. In
Hooper, the court indicated that "common prudence" is not necessarily "reason-
75 It has been suggested that there must be "some unequivocal act indicating an intent to
dedicate it [a manuscript] to the public. . . ." Pickard, Common-Law Rights Before Publi-
cation, ASCAP THIRD COPYRIGHT SYMPOsIuM 299, 309 (1940), citing Werckmeister v.
Springer Lithographing Co., 63 F. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1894). But see 1 NiMMER, suPra note 64,
§ 58.3 at 229.
In any event, in order to divest common law rights, the act of publication must be per-
formed by the author or at his direction. See Walden, Common Law Rights in Literary Prop-
erty, 37 .T. PAT OFF. Soc'Y 642, 650 (1955). This would preclude a third party from effecting
a general publication for the purpose of dedicating the work to the public domain so that un-
limited use could be made of it.
76 Ascertainment of the "reasonable expectations" or "reasonable understandings" between
the parties is an accepted practice in the interpretation of ambiguous contracts. Courts often
find it necessary to inquire into such matters as the meaning of contractual words at the time
and place they were used, and the general course of dealings, performance and trade custom
in the locale. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LA w OF CONTRACTS §§ 47, 52 (1970).
But see text accompanying notes 77-78 infra.
77 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 '(1932).
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able prudence"; in certain situations there are "precautions so imperative that
even their universal regard will not excuse their omission."" With regard to
the issue of student expectations in copyright matters, a common expectation
need not be treated as a reasonable expectation under the circumstances of each
case. In other words, a court should not feel bound by the fact, for example, that
students commonly believe that all rights in their literary property are lost upon
transfer of possession for course credit. Rather, the court should inquire further
to ascertain what would have been reasonable to expect had there been an aware-
ness by students that rights would not necessarily be lost as a result of this sort
of transfer. This guideline test seems appropriate in that the likelihood of a stu-
dent relinquishing his proprietary rights by a transfer bears an inverse relation-
ship to the substantiality of the work, i.e., the more substantial the work, the less
likely the intent to transfer.
2. What was the nature and extent of instructional input?
a. Assignment of topic with no supervision or assistance.
b. General advisory-type input.
c. Substantial guidance and supervision.
A reasoned approach to this element would suggest the following analytic
guideline: the more active and direct the supervisory role, the more improved
the position of the supervisor in claiming a proprietary interest in the work. The
dual questions of "whether any interest was passed" and "what is the extent of
that (proprietary) interest" must be viewed in light of the aforementioned issue
of the substantiality of the work. Assuming that the student's intent has not been
expressed, the expectations of both parties must be implied. From an evidentiary
standpoint, it should be the purported transferee who must prove the intent to
transfer at the moment of delivery. It is here proposed that a court apply a rebut-
table presumption of "no transfer"-that all rights will be reserved to the author
unless the purported transferee produces evidence to warrant a contrary conclu-
sion. This would provide the reverse of the approach taken in the author for hire
situations."9 From the standpoint of copyright policy, as well as the normal rules
of evidence, it seems patently unfair to impose upon the student a transfer of
ownership and copyright merely because of a failure to expressly reserve those
rights at the time of the transfer of possession. The Court in Stephens v. Cady9°
took a similar view, even where there had been a valid conveyance of the original
work, an engraved copperplate.
[Even the transfer of the manuscript of a book will not, at common law,
carry with it a right to print and publish the work, without the express con-
sent of the author, as the property of the manuscript, and the right to multi-
ply the copies are two separate and distinct interests.8l
78 Id. at 740.
79 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
80 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852).
81 Id. at 529.
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3. What was done with the work after submission?
a. Retained by instructor or department.
b. Copied and retained, original returned.
c. Copied and distributed for instructional purposes.
d. Copied and deposited in school library.
If a student has submitted more than one copy of a work, or when consent
has been given to reproduce the original, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the student impliedly transferred ownership in the limited number of copies of
that work. In all probability, the instructor could be viewed as a licensee, inas-
much as the author's express (or implied) consent had been given to make a
certain number of copies for the instructor's own use. In copyright law, a licensee
is a person who has been conveyed anything less than the "totality of rights com-
manded by copyright." 2
The student author should be made aware of the fact that under certain
circumstances, deposit of his work in a library may constitute a divestitive publi-
cation. Where the library is "public" as opposed to purely private, and where
access to the work is not limited to a special class of persons, the student would
be well advised to submit the work for deposit with notice of statutory copyright,
rather than relying upon his common law rights.8" (This does not answer the
question regarding transfer of the underlying copyright, which should still have
to be proved by the purported transferee.)
4. What rights are being claimed by the alleged transferee?
a. Ownership of the copy.
b. Grant of a license to copy the work in a particular manner.
c. Assignment of copyright.
A recognition of the substantial disparity that exists between the relative
bargaining powers of students, as opposed to instructors, has prompted the fol-
lowing guideline for analysis: the greater the interest claimed by the transferee,
the more persuasive must be the implication that the student freely intended to
convey that interest. This does not seem too harsh a standard to impose on per-
sons attempting to prove a transfer of anything more than ownership rights in a
copy, especially considering that the express consent of the student is so readily
obtainable.
It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the element of voluntariness
must be viewed as an indispensable consideration in the transfer situation. Care-
ful analysis of the student-faculty relationship reveals that there are many un-
spoken but well known "rules" that govern academic life. With the ever-increas-
ing importance of grades and one's standing in the university, many students
are loath to confront the instructional staff lest some sort of retribution be
exacted in the form of lower grades and the like. Whether such practices do in
fact take place is not as important as the student's subjective belief that penalties
82 2 NIMME,, supra note 64, § 119.1 at 511.
83 See Walden, supra note 75, at 650-55.
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could result from a contest over copyright84
5. What manner of use is the author seeking to prevent?
a. Reproduction or mere retention of a copy of the work.
b. Use of a substantial portion of the work in modified form.
c. Any use whatsoever.
Although this factor raises issues that will be discussed at length in the next
section of this article,"5 note that it is unlikely that a court will prevent "insub-
stantial" uses of a work protected under common law copyright.8
It is clear that each case requires an in-depth factual analysis to determine
the result of a transfer transaction. The reasonable expectations of the parties
must be considered in this attempt to divine the author's intentions at the moment
of delivery of the work. Reported cases provide little guidance for predicting how
a court will weigh or determine intent where the transfer has not been performed
pursuant to a sale of the work. For example, in cases where an absolute and
unconditional sale of a protected work of art has been followed by a transfer of
possession, courts have traditionally implied, by operation of law, an assignment
of the underlying copyright to the purchaser as a part of the sale agreement.8
7
In these sale situations, courts have presumed an implied assignment.8 8 This
presumption places upon an author the burden of coming forward with evidence
to show that he expressly reserved those rights to himself.8 9 However, Professor
Nimmer has contended that "[tlhis rule of construction is most unfortunate in
that it creates a legal presumption of intent when more often than not such
intent probably does not exist in fact." 90
In cases involving the sale of a manuscript rather than a work of art, courts
have been reluctant to allow the purported transferee to rely solely upon this
presumption.91 This is sound policy in those transfers where nothing more is
shown than a gratuitous transfer of possession of the work. Where the facts sup-
port little else than the possible creation of some sort of bailment, 2 there is no
conceivable reason for presuming an implied assignment. Logic compels placing
upon the transferee the burden of proving that the author intended to convey to
him title to either the physical copy, or the full copyright interest. This result is
mandated by the dualistic nature of literary property, whereby the underlying
copyrightable matter exists separately from the tangible copy. 8 Mere possession
84 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
85 See notes 100-50 infra and accompanying text.
86 See note 150 infra.
87 See Yardley v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1940); Parton v.
Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273, 1278 (No. 10, 784) (C.C.D. Mass. 1872); Pushman v. New York
Graphic Soc., 287 N.Y. 302, 306-07, 39 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 '(1942).
88 See 2 NrmMER, supra note 64, § 125.12 at 540-41.
89 See, e.g., Yardley v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d at 30-32; Pushman v. New York
Graphic Soc., 287 N.Y. at 306-08, 39 N.E.2d at 250-51.
90 See 2 Nimnraa, supra note 64, § 125.12 at 541 (citations omitted).
91 See, e.g., Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528, 530 (1852).
92 A bailment has been broadly defined as "the rightful possession of goods by one who is
not the owner." 4 S. WLiSTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTs 2888 (rev. ed. 1936). In a typical
bailment situation, the owner delivers possession of an item to a second party for a specific pur-
pose. See R. BRowN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 73 (rev. ed. 1955).
93 See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
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of a protected work, without more, should not affect the underlying literary
property.9" No decision has been found that supports a contrary conclusion.
Notwithstanding the likelihood that courts will view these transfer situations
as involving essentially consensual interpersonal agreements with which they
would not ordinarily interfere, there is an element of "public interest" that they
may consider. It is basic copyright policy to encourage the production and dissemi-
nation of ideas through a grant of limited monopoly to authors.95 The proprietary
claims of authors, however, must often be balanced against the demands of public
policy for greater access to these protected works.96
From both an institutional and legal point of view, the student author who
claims a protectible property interest in work submitted for academic credit con-
fronts certain problems, the foremost being the question of who is entitled to the
copyright in that production. As will be discussed," it is usually more difficult to
determine what constitutes a permissible "fair use" of a protected work than it
is to determine that the student has departed with his protectible interest, but
any student wishing to protect his copyright interest should clarify his intent at
the time of delivery of possession to the institution. When there is any question
in the student's mind that his copyright may be violated, he should express his
intentions in writing. Although the commentators do not discuss this technique,
there is no reason why a student could not submit the work with notice of com-
mon law copyright. A court would probably consider this a sufficient reservation
of rights in the event of a later contest. Furthermore, the student could double
his protection, in a manner of speaking, by submitting the work with notice of
statutory copyright. If the work is published, it will be protected by statutory
copyright, assuming that the notice complies with formalities.9" If the work re-
mains unpublished for a time, the use of the statutory notice would not cause a
divesting of the common law rights. This is supported by the court's statement
in Fader v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. :
Congress has not provided that one who seeks to obtain the benefits of
statutory protection must surrender his common law copyright if statutory
copyright is not afforded him.
Of course, many students may fear that in presenting a claim of copyright
contrary to the expectations of their instructor, they would cause displeasure that
could be manifested in a variety of forms (e.g., lower grades, poor recommen-
dations). Unless courts are willing to consider such fears when considering the
transfer issue, students should engage in their own balancing test, i.e., weighing
94 See generally notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
95 See note 63 supra, and notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
96 Cf. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 '(1912).
97 For example:
NOTICE OF COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT
All rights reserved by the author. No part of this [paper] may be reproduced in
any form, by any process, without the express written consent of the author.
Physical delivery of possession of this [paper] to any person is not to be deemed
a transfer of any of the author's proprietary rights herein.
98 See note 16 infra.
99 169 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
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the potential benefits against the possible detriment in asserting a claim of copy-
right. Thus, the "legal" problems of student authors may well be more conducive
to resolution in an institutional than a judicial setting.
C. The Student Author's Protectible Copyright Interest
Assuming that the student author has preserved intact the common law
copyright in his unpublished work, remaining issues relate to the precise nature
of the student's protectible copyright interest. Common law copyright will afford,
at a minimum, the same scope of protection as statutory copyright."' However,
the question of what, if any, additional rights are granted under the common
law is not so easily answered. In light of the problems faced by the student au-
thor, the focus is on whether any use that is less than an infringing use will be
actionable under common law copyright. Does the common law copyright pro-
hibit "any unauthorized use" in the broadest sense of that term, or does it merely
prevent unauthorized copying and publication of a protected work? Before
addressing these specific questions, it is necessary to briefly consider three basic
concepts in the law of copyright.
1. Publication
The concept of "publication" is fundamental to the law of copyright. 1 '
Publication provides the dividing line between common law and statutory copy-
right. It is the act by which an author divests himself of common law copyright;
furthermore, publication with notice invests the statutory copyright. 2 However,
as was stated in American Visuals Corp. v. Holland,' "[ilt is... perfectly clear
that the word 'publication' does not have the same legal meaning in all con-
texts." As Judge Frank suggested in American Visuals, analysis of the cases re-
veals that the act of "publication" that will divest an author of the common law
right on the one hand, is not the same act of "publication" that will invest the
statutory right on the other; "[i]n each case the courts appear to treat the con-
cept of 'publication' as to prevent piracy."' 0 ' Courts seek either to maintain
intact the common law rights, or to establish the statutory copyright, whichever
will serve to protect the literary property of authors. This result-oriented approach
has tended to produce inconsistent standards of publication: a minimal act of
dissemination will invest the statutory right, whereas a general and open dissemi-
nation is required before the author will be divested of his common law copy-
100 This property in unpublished works raises rights then, which are at least co-extensive
with the rights commanded under the Copyright Act except to the extent that statu-
tory rights may be exercised after as well as prior to publication.
1 N Im ER, supra note 64, § 111 at 454, citing inter alia, Echevarria v. Warner Brothers Pic-
tures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
101 See notes 10-28 supra and accompanying text.
102 See American Visuals v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956), for the seminal discus-
sion of investive and divestive publication. See also Cary, supra note 68. But see 1 NMMER,
supra note 64, § 58.2.
103 239 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir. 1956).
104 Id. at 744. Compare Werckmeister v. Pierce & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 72 F. 54 (1st Cir.
1896) with Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904), where





In strict copyright terms, a person is considered a "pirate" when he has in-
fringed a protected work. The court in Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co.106
explained as follows:
Where a person gifted with genius and imagination has by industry pro-
duced something attractive and interesting to the general public, which has
a commercial or monetary value, there is always a temptation to persons of
lesser qualities to imitate and exploit it to their own profit. In books or plays
such imitative acts are called plagiarism; in commercial art or design it is
called piracy; in general it is given the colloquial term "chiseling."
Infringement, which is also termed "plagiarism," 1 7 is an unpermitted copy-
ing of a work protected under copyright.0 ' Plagiarism, in copyright law, is not
merely an exact, word for word copying of a protected work. The more expan-
sive copyright view of what constitutes a "copy" is based upon practical realities.
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at
common law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally
to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.10 9
As was explained further in Cantor v. Mandiewicz:"0
It is of course true that copying, as construed in the law of plagiarism,
is not confined to a literary repetition, but includes various ways in which
the matter in any publication may be adopted, imitated or transferred, with
more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy.
The threshold test of infringement is whether there is a substantial similarity
between the protected work and the purported copy.1 1' The inquiry and evalu-
ation are both quantitative (as to substantiality) and qualitative (as to the issue
of similarity). Where the challenged act consists of liberal paraphrasing or failure
to attribute, as opposed to literal and exact copying of a work, the question of
105 See cases cited note 104 supra. See generally American Visuals v. Holland, 239 F.2d
at 742-44; Cary, supra note 9; and, 1 NinEnR, supra note 64, §§ 46-50, 58-59.
106 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275 (1940).
107 See Herwitz v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 231, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), where it was stated, "[ilnfringement of a common law copyright is a tort, commonly
called plagiarism."
108 See generally 2 NiMMnR, supra note 64, §§ 141-43.
109 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 '(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931). The Nichols court indicated that the decision as to substantiality is
more troublesome when "the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract of
the whole .... ." Id.
110 203 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
111 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878), "to infringe [copyright] a substantial
copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced." See also 0'Rourke v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, 44 F. Supp. 480. 482 (D. Mass. 1942), where it was said that "it is not neces-
sary to exactly duplicate another's literary work to be liable for plagiarism, it being sufficient if
an unfair use of such work is made by the lifting of a substantial portion of it." And see
Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1941), and cases there cited.
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infringement becomes a difficult one to answer." 2 The issue is further compli-
cated in that ideas, themselves, are not protectible. This was explained in Stowe
v. Thomas:"'
The claim of literary property . .. cannot be in the ideas, sentiments,
or the creations of the imagination of the poet or novelist as dissevered from
the language, idiom, style, or the outward semblance and exhibition of them.
His exclusive property ... cannot be vested in the author as abstractions,
but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language
in which he has clothed them.
Thus, the issue of infringement can be stated as follows: Has the author's expres-
sion been appropriated, through concrete and identifiable paraphrasing (an in-
fringement), or did the alleged pirate merely take the author's "ideas" and
express them in his own words (no infringement)? Unless there is a significant
and marked similarity between the protected work and the purported copy, courts
will not treat the appropriation as an actionable statutory copyright infringe-
ment."4
3. Fair Use
The doctrine of "fair use" limits the monopoly granted an author under
copyright; it has been characterized as "the most troublesome [issue] in the whole
law of copyright."" 5 "Fair use" is generally a defense to an action for copyright
infringement, whereby the defendant attempts to justify his appropriation of the.
author's work as a permissible fair use."" It has been defined as "a privilege in
others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a rea-
sonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner of the copyright.""117 The importance of the doctrine cannot be over-
stated, inasmuch as the issue "what is a fair use" poses essentially the same ques-
tion as "what is the extent of the monopoly afforded by copyright?""'  Unfortu-
nately, this term has been used in at least three distinct conceptual contexts." 9
First, courts have treated fair use as a technical infringement that is permitted,
112 See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stoneifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.
1944), where it is stated that "literal or complete appropriation of the protected property
rarely occurs."
113 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (No. 13,514) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853).
114 See Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judges Approach, 43 VA. L. RIv. 375
(1957); 2 NIMMER, supra note 64, §§ 168 et seq. See also notes 115-50 and accompanying
text for the complete discussion of the doctrine of fair use as it applies to common law copy-
right.
115 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
116 See 2 NrMmER, supra note 64, § 145.
117 BALL, THE LAW OF COPYWGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), quoted in Study
No. 14, infra note 118, at 5.
118 See generally LATMAN, FAiR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY NO. 14, SUBCOMM.
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGATS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1961 [hereinafter cited as Study No. 141; 2 NiMMER, supra note 64, § 145.




nevertheless, because of some overriding copyright policy.' Second, the term
has been employed to refer to a use of unprotected matter in a copyrighted work,
such as the theme or ideas."l And third, the term "fair use" has been employed
in situations where the appropriation of protected matter did not amount to the
threshold standard of substantial similarity.12 One commentator has declared
that this type of threefold distinction has no practical significance.2 3 Neverthe-
less, this interchangeable use of the term creates not only conceptual problems, but
difficulties in applying the doctrine of fair use in the area of common law copy-
right.
A compendium of the many cases applying the doctrine reveals more than
mere imprecision. 2 4 In particular, it reveals that there is considerable confusion
regarding the nature and outer limits of the fair use doctrine, and whether there
is such a thing as a "fair use" of a common law copyright. Two somewhat
contradictory positions have emerged regarding the full extent of the protections
afforded by common law copyright. It has been suggested, on the one hand,
that an author has the right to exclusive use of his work, which includes the
power to prevent any unauthorized use of that production.' Conversely, it
has been urged that the common law copyright gives the author a right to
first publication, and that the only preventable uses are those which usurp that
right. 2 In practice, the disparity between these two polar positions is remark-
able. It is the difference between being able to prevent any use of the work for
whatever purpose, and being obliged to allow an unauthorized user to appropri-
ate and disseminate the work as if he were the true owner. As regards this second
position, the user is allowed to utilize and disseminate the work as long as he
does not cause a general publication of the work. 27 This limitation is untenable
for two reasons. First, it is directly contrary to the copyright policy of courts
which tends to define publication so as to prevent piracy."s Furthermore, its effect
is to permit the author no greater control over his work than a stranger who is
careful enough not to cause a divestive publication. The essential flaw here is that
120 See Study No. 14, supra note 118, at 10-11, for a discussion of the applicability of fair
use in the area of scholarly works and compilations. See also Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-
Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 '(6th Cir. 1943); and cases cited 2 NIMmXER, supra note 64, § 145 at
648.1 n.194.
121 See Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938), where
it was stated that, "[flair use is defined as copying the theme or ideas rather than their expres-
sion." See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 '(2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
122 In copyright infringement cases . . . the Problem before the Court is concrete and
specific in each case to determine from all the facts in evidence whether there has
been a substantial taking from an original and copyrighted property, and therefore an
unfair use of the protected work.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944) (emphasis
added).
123 Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, ASCAP Sixrr COPYRIGHT LAW SymPosruM
43. 46 (1955).
124 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 120-22 supra.
125 See Study No. 29 at 4; 1 NIMmER, supra note 64, § 111 at 455.
126 See, e.g., Estate of I-emin way v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462. 464-71, 279
N.Y.S.2d 51, 54-61 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 296 N.Y.S.2d
771, 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968). Note that the Appellate Division did not incorporate into its
affirmance the Supreme Court's treatment of this issue.
127 Id. at 464, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 55, citing in support of this position White v. Kimmel, 193
F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
128 See notes 102-03, supra and accompanying text; see also cases cited note 104 supra.
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it is well settled that only the author or an authorized person can cause a publi-
cation divesting the common law copyright.
1 20
In any event, commentators have for the most part agreed on the first posi-
tion, that the doctrine of fair use has no application in the area of common law
copyright.3 This view is misleading, since it is unclear what is meant precisely by
the term "fair use." Does this mean that insubstantial uses of works protected
under common law copyright are not permitted? Does it mean that the ideas or
theme underlying the work, which normally are not protected, are absolutely pro-
tected under common law copyright? Or, does it simply mean that those technical
infringements usually permitted as a "fair use" because of their scientific, histori-
cal, or educational purpose, or because the infringing use would not diminish the
potential market for the author's work, are not allowed under common law copy-
right? Unfortunately, the legal commentaries provide no answers, except insofar
as it is concluded, without convincing citation, explanation or logical justification,
that "any unauthorized use of the work is an infringement."1 3 ' In fact, one
prominent writer has asserted that there are "no cases squarely so holding, while
some by implication deny this proposition."'
3 2
In the earlier American cases, common law copyright was often referred to as
the "right of first publication."' 33 This terminology appears to have sprung from
the belief that the author's ownership of his literary property was absolute and
exclusive until the work was published.1 3 4 Accordingly, the author was regarded
as having a wide degree of choice as to the use to which the work could be put:
he could keep the work in his exclusive possession, he could cause a "limited publi-
cation" of the work, or he could prevent an unauthorized general publication of
the work. This view is represented in Frohman v. Ferris: 5
At common law the author of a literary composition had an absolute prop-
erty right in his production which he could not be deprived of so long as it
remained unpublished, nor could he be compelled to publish it.
An excellent example of a case in which the common law right was described
as the right of first publication is Palmer v. De Witt. "' Quoting from the English
129 See note 75 supra.
130 See 1 NIMmEm, supra note 64, § 111 at 455-56; Study No. 29, supra note 1 at 4; Wilson,
supra note 64, at 105, 113; Fisher, Privilege of Using Public and Private Manuscripts in the
Production of Art, U. CHICAGO CONF. ON THE ARTS, PUBLISHING, AND THE LAW 113 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Fisher].
131 See Study No. 29, supra note 1, at 4; 1 NimMER, supra note 64, § 111 at 455. See also
note 130 supra. But see note 132 infra.
132 2 NimmER, supra note 64, § 145 at 643 n.172 (and supplement).
133 "The right to make copies before publication and the right of first publication are
common law rights." Werckmeister v. American Lithograph Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir.
1904). See also Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., 287 N.Y. 302, 307, 39 N.E.2d 249, 250-51
(1942); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 537 '(1872). The pertinent excerpt from Palmer
appears in text at note 138 infra-
134 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591. n.1 (1834).
135 Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 435, 87 N.E. 327, 328 (1909); aff'd, 223 U.S. 424
(1912). See also Taft v. Smith, Gray & Co., 76 Misc. 283, 286, 134 N.Y.S. 1011, 1013 (1912),
where the court stated that "before publication the right of the producer is absolute." And
see, Baker v. Libbie. 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).




case of Millar v. Taylor,37 the Palmer court stated:
The manuscript is, in every sense, his [the author's] peculiar property, and
no man may take it from him, or make any use of it which he has not au-
thorized, without being guilty of a violation of his property; and as every
author or proprietor has a right to determine whether he will publish it or
not, he has a right to first publication and whoever deprives him of that
priority is guilty of a manifest wrong, and the courts have a right to stop it.138
The court in Palmer was apparently moved to extend this veil of protection over
the unpublished work because it viewed the author's property in his manuscript
as indistinguishable from other personal property: "[T]he right to literary property
is as sacred as other species of property."1"9 In the more recent case of Fender v.
Morosco,"4 ° the court engaged in rather interesting postulation regarding the
author's common law rights:
We are not now considering whether the defendant ... made a fair use of
plaintiff's play. Since plaintiff had not published or produced her play,
perhaps any use that others made of it might be unfair. Perhaps a wrong
was committed if the defendant. . . even read the play. This action is not
brought to redress such wrong. We consider only whether the defendants
have appropriated the plaintiff's literary property.
Perhaps most directly on point is the statement in Stanley v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. :
1
41
The common law prohibits any kind of unauthorized interference with, or
use of, an unpublished work on the ground of an exclusive property right,...
while a statutory copyright permits a "fair use" of the copyrighted publi-
cation, without deeming it an infringement.
These cases are not definitive, however, regarding the extent of the author's
protectible copyright interest under the common law. The confusion in the area
largely results from two factors. First, it must be recognized that § 2 of the Copy-
right Act' is merely a "savings clause," reserving to the states the right to main-
tain the law of common law copyright in unpublished works .14  That section
reads as follows:. 4
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity,
to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without
his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
137 98 EngB. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
138 47 N.Y. 532, 536-37 (1872) (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 539.
140 253 N.Y. 281, 291, 171 N.E. 56, 59 (1930) (emphasis added) (opinion by Lehman, J.).
141 35 Cal. 2d 653, 661, 221 P.2d 73, 78 (1950). See also McCarter v. Barton Music
Corp., 115 U.S.P.Q. 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957); Cantor v. Manldewicz, 203 N.Y.S.2d 626,
628 (Sup. Ct. 1960), where it was stated that "the common law prohibits any unauthorized
use of ... [the unpublished work, based upon] ... plaintiff's exclusive right to possess, use,
and dispose of her literary property."
142 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
143 Study No. 29, supra note 1, at 3.
144 17 U.S.C. § 2 '(1970) (emphasis added).
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In some cases it appears that courts have misconstrued this section by reading
into it more than was plainly intended. For example, in the case of McCarter v.
Barton Music Corp.,'45 the court refers to the common law right as "the right to
prevent copying, publication or use of any... unpublished composition without
first having obtained the consent of the owner or author." As should be apparent,
this phrase "copying, publication or use" is the precise language employed in § 2
of the Copyright Act. But note that § 2 does not create a substantive right; it
merely leaves intact the state law that had provided common law copyright in
the first instance. The question of whether an author could prevent "any unau-
thorized use" was and remains a matter of state law.
Second, there is the problem of ascertaining the precise meaning of the
phrase "any unauthorized use." While early cases treated literary property as a
form of personal property, there was, even then, a recognition of the peculiar as-
pects of literary property.'46 Use of literary property, such as manuscripts and
books, is quite different from use of other personal property, such as a bicycle or a
table. As applied to literary property, the term "use" includes many activities
ranging from a mere reading of a manuscript, 4 ' to a minimal amount of ap-
propriation, 14 to exact replication of the protected work. 49 The final question,
therefore, is whether common law copyright will reach out to prevent a mere
reading of a manuscript or an insubstantial taking, because the author does not
see fit to authorize that use. Or do public interest/copyright policy considerations
mandate at least a minimum of access to and dissemination of the contents of
these "protected" works?
Again, neither commentators nor courts clearly define the extent of the
author's protectible interest, and neither squarely answer the question whether
the doctrine of fair use should apply to common law copyrighted works. Review
of case law leads to the obvious conclusion that wholesale pirating of student work
protected under common law copyright will be treated as an actionable infringe-
ment, much the same way as it is treated under federal statute: minimal
types of use of these same student works will likely be permitted. This includes
such uses as reading the work and "insubstantial takings" of the unpublished
material.'50 This suggestion recognizes that courts are generally loath to prevent
the use of protected material when it will be in the public interest to provide
increased accessibility and dissemination, and when the proprietary interest of the
author is not irrevocably impaired. In the last analysis, the fair use doctrine may
indeed apply in the area of common law copyright, but with one special twist. In
145 115 U.S.P.Q. 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
146 See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text; consider especially the case of Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912), which is excerpted in text accompanying note
7 supra.
147 Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); Fender v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281,
171 N.E. 56 (1930).
148 This would encompass copying that is either substantial, or a use that will not con-
stitute copying because of a lack of similarity. See notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
149 Although wholesale appropriation of a protected work is most often considered an
actionable infringement, the defense of fair use may transmute that act into a permissible
taking. See notes 115-50 supra.
150 See Fisher, supra note 130, at 113:
While it is sometimes said that the courts have developed no doctrine of fair use of
common law literary property, it is hardly likely that any tribunal would hold the
mere private reading of such property an infringement.
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balancing the public interest against the author's monopoly, the court will have
to consider the potential detriment to the value of the author's work that is posed
by permitting even limited uses of the work.
IV. Conclusion: Toward an Institutional Settlement
Any consideration of the copyright problems of students must clearly ac-
knowledge a very practical distinction between the student and the professional
scholar. The student is not an independent author-entrepreneur, but is in a sense
a "captive" of the academic institution. Once matriculated, he must pay tuition
and abide by rigid rules of academic conduct, all with the ultimate hope of secur-
ing an academic degree. It is in some senses a by-product of the student's aca-
demic endeavors that he produces copyrightable material.
Although the copyright issues discussed herein are undeniably legal in scope,
it is clear that an administrative or institutional forum is more appropriate for
dispute settlement than the legal process. The establishment of a university policy
regarding student copyright protection could prevent many disputes from arising
in the first instance. Making available to students and staff comprehensible in-
formation on copyright law is a necessary concomitant of such a university copy-
right policy. Furthermore, formal procedures for dealing with violations of the
university rules would also be required. This plan envisions the adoption of a
code of conduct applicable to the entire academic community-students and
faculty alike. These procedures would ameliorate the ironic situation present on
many university campuses: strict disciplinary codes of academic conduct apply
to acts of plagiarism by students (and are enforced), while faculty are somehow
immune from application of the same or a similar standard.
Until such guidelines are established, the student author should consider
the copyright questions of whether and how to protect literary property. Because
the legal issues regarding student copyright cannot be answered with certainty,
and because actual dispute resolution will most likely depend on the peculiar
facts involved in each case, the following guide is offered to assist on deciding the
questions of whether and how to secure copyright.
A. Ascertain whether the particular work has a present "value" or
is worth protecting for the future. If it does, then
B. Make some determination whether the work will be published.
Remember that unpublished works are protected by common law copy-
right, but published works must appear with statutory notice.
C. Ensure that copyright has been reserved, if and when necessary.
This means notification of your reservation of common law right if the
work is to remain unpublished; if the work will be disseminated to a large
group of persons, it must appear with proper notice to invest statutory
copyright.
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Where the student wants to guarantee that copyright will apply to an especially
valuable work, competent legal counsel should be obtained.
Ultimately, the fundamental question in the law of copyright is "[h]ow to
balance the rights of the creative author and his incentive to continued produc-
tion against those of users and the public interest."' '51 As was said in the early
English case of Sayre v. Moore:'52
We must take care to guard against two extremes, equally prejudicial:
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service
of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward
of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world may not be deprived
of improvements, nor the progress of the arts retarded.
Student authors face a number of difficult problems with regard to obtain-
ing and preserving copyright in their literary works. Whether the student will be
able to protect his literary property in a given situation will, as with other authors,
depend upon a balancing of personal property rights against the public's interest
in the free dissemination of intellectual productions. In many situations, the best
protection for which the student can hope is truthful attribution of the work-
compelling the use of his name as the true author. But whatever the result in
the specific case, students should continue to be reminded that copyright is a
valuable property interest that ought not to be disregarded.' 5 3
151 Id. at 115.
152 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1785).
153 [In most cases the only thing of value resulting from an author's tangible creative
work is the intangible copyright. Copyright is a valuable property right, and should
not be treated lightly .... Only by securing to authors the exclusive rights to their
respective writings can constitutional purpose be attained-the promotion of the
progress of the arts.
Caterini, Contribution to Periodicals, ASCAP TENTH COPYRIGHT LAw SYMposium 321, 385-
86 (1959).
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